Darren Chaker: Leading the Way in Privacy and First Amendment Law

February 14, 2025

Viewpoint Discrimination by Darren Chaker

Darren Chaker Explores First Amendment Proscribable Speech Viewpoint Discrimination.

California Supreme Court Case S275272 Potential Impact

Currently, the California Supreme Court is examining a notable exception to stare decisis principles, particularly in the context of California’s lower courts and application to police. Following Ninth Circuit precedent in Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215 which reversed the California Supreme Court in finding Penal Code § 148.6. This issue is at the forefront in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, Case No. S275272.
Police abuse, police beating, require a free complaint process.

Case No. S275272 decides if complaints can be made freely.

Darren Chaker on Understanding Stare Decisis: A Closer Look at Precedent in Law Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, No. S275272

One of the foundational principles in law is the doctrine of stare decisis, derived from the Latin phrase "stare decisis et non quieta movere." Legal researcher Darren Chaker found this this doctrine interesting in law school, where its meaning is to adhere to precedent and not unsettle what is established. This is a cornerstone of legal jurisprudence. As highlighted in the case In re Osborne, 76 F. 3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996), stare decisis fundamentally posits that decisions of higher courts are binding precedent on lower courts. While this understanding suffices for law school, practicing attorneys, particularly in states like California, need to grasp the doctrine's deeper intricacies.

Divergent Paths of Stare Decisis in Federal and California Law are Omnipresent in Case. No. S275272

The operation of horizontal stare decisis varies significantly between federal and California law practices. In the federal system, decisions from one circuit court of appeals, as explained in Hart v. Massanari, 266 F. 3d 1155, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2001), may serve as persuasive precedent but are not binding on other circuit courts. This creates a landscape where different circuits can reach divergent conclusions, paving the way for Supreme Court decisions.

Contrastingly, within the Ninth Circuit, horizontal stare decisis is more rigid. As established in Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F. 3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003), the first Ninth Circuit panel to publish an opinion on an issue binds not only district courts within the circuit but also subsequent Ninth Circuit panels. Overruling a precedent within the Ninth Circuit necessitates an en banc decision.

However, brief writer Darren Chaker finds the California Court of Appeal operates differently, with no horizontal stare decisis among appellate panels, as seen in Marriage of Shaban, 88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 409 (2001). This allows for potential discrepancies in decisions across different districts or divisions within the California Court of Appeal, creating a complex judicial landscape overseen by the California Supreme Court. The court stated, “[B]ecause there is no ‘horizontal stare decisis’ within the Court of Appeal, intermediate appellate court precedent that might otherwise be binding on a trial court is not absolutely binding on a different panel of the appellate court.” (Id.)

Contrastingly, within the Ninth Circuit, horizontal stare decisis is more rigid. As established in Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F. 3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003), the first Ninth Circuit panel to publish an opinion on an issue binds not only district courts within the circuit but also subsequent Ninth Circuit panels. Overruling a precedent within the Ninth Circuit necessitates an en banc decision.

Application of Supreme Courts and Overruling Precedents Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, S275272

Both federal and state supreme courts possess the autonomy to overrule their own precedents, a subject of extensive scholarly debate. This debate is alive and well where the court must decide a case Darren Chaker started is now before the California Supreme Court in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, S275272.

The Intersection of Federal the Ninth Circuit Decision in Chaker v. Crogan and State Law Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, S275272

Currently, the California Supreme Court is examining a notable exception to stare decisis principles, particularly in the context of California’s lower courts and application to police. Following Ninth Circuit precedent in Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215 which reversed the California Supreme Court in finding Penal Code § 148.6. This issue is at the forefront in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, Case No. S275272.

The case is pivotal in determining if state and municipal police agencies must adhere to the ruling in Chaker v. Crogan, a landmark case addressing the First Amendment implications of viewpoint discrimination.

Case No. S275272 decides if complaints can be  made freely without fear of prosecution.
Case No. S275272 decides if complaints can be
made freely without fear of prosecution.

Chaker v. Crogan: A Landmark Case on Viewpoint Discrimination the California Supreme Court Certified to Rehear in Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, S275272

Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215, cert. den. 547 U.S. 1128, revolves around the constitutionality of California Penal Code section 148.6, which criminalizes the filing of false complaints against police officers. This case raises critical questions about viewpoint discrimination and First Amendment rights, probing whether this penal code provision discriminates based on the speaker's viewpoint. The ongoing case of Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, S275272, is set to determine the extent of adherence to the Chaker v. Crogan decision, marking a significant moment in the intersection of federal and state law interpretations.

The California Supreme Court granted review and certified questions to address in part: (1) Does Penal Code section 148.6, subdivision (a), particularly subdivision (a)(2), constitute improper viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment? (2) Does Penal Code section 148.6, subdivision (a), particularly subdivision (a)(2), impose an impermissible burden on the ability to file, or on the City to accept, police misconduct complaints? See Case No. S275272.

For further details on the legal intricacies and implications of these cases, visit Viewpoint Discrimination and First Amendment Implications of Chaker v. Crogan.

error: Content is protected !!